{"id":544,"date":"2026-09-02T14:27:04","date_gmt":"2026-09-02T14:27:04","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/nationalconsumerreportss.com\/?p=544"},"modified":"2026-09-02T14:27:04","modified_gmt":"2026-09-02T14:27:04","slug":"persistent-engagement-and-the-illusion-of-cyber-equilibrium","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/nationalconsumerreportss.com\/?p=544","title":{"rendered":"Persistent Engagement and the Illusion of Cyber Equilibrium"},"content":{"rendered":"
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The United States is now eight years into a military strategy and academic theory built, in part, on a daring view of how to achieve stability in cyberspace. <\/p>\n

Read more Lawfare Daily: The Trials of the Trump Administration, September 1<\/a><\/p>\n

The U.S. Cyber Command remains \u201c in cyberspace operations against the world\u2019s most dangerous foreign adversary threats [and] routinely denies or manipulates the most significant foreign cyber threats to the Nation.\u201d The command\u2019s goal \u201cis to improve the security and stability of cyberspace.\u201d The idea\u2014stability through more military offensive cyber operations\u2014is backed by substantial scholarship. <\/p>\n

We are skeptical. Enthusiasm for this concept\u2014and the accompanying \u201ccyber persistence theory\u201d\u2014may be based more on its success in describing the past few years of cyber conflict than on any ability to stabilize cyberspace. Persistent engagement is one thing if it attempts to establish a balanced equilibrium, but quite another when one or both sides are seeking dominance over cyberspace, which they see as an increasingly existential necessity amid a period of rising international turmoil. <\/p>\n

This article briefly examines constant contact and persistent engagement, then discusses concepts of strategic equilibria from other contexts, and proposes recommendations.<\/p>\n

Three Decades of Constant (but Evolving) Contact<\/strong><\/p>\n

Because states are in \u201cconstant contact\u201d with one another in cyberspace\u2014their cyber forces continuously contesting for initiative and advantage\u2014Michael Fischerkeller, Emily Goldman, and Richard Harknett argue that U.S. cyber strategy must reorient to embrace a cyber persistence theory. This theory entails U.S. personnel engaging with adversary cyber forces continuously as a \u201cstructurally and strategically driven imperative.\u201d The theory argues such a strategy will \u201ccontribute to stability\u201d by \u201cclarify[ing] the distinction between acceptable and unacceptable behavior in cyberspace.\u201d<\/p>\n

The United States\u2014or any interconnected state, according to theory\u2014must persistently conduct operations to erode its rival\u2019s national security, while simultaneously countering the rival\u2019s operations to do the same. Initiative and action, not restraint, are what keep conflicts limited. Because \u201c<\/em>adversaries intending to limit the type of conflict can come to tacit understandings of constraints,\u201d such contestation will lead to stability. Adversaries find the bounds by overstepping them.<\/p>\n

The prescriptions of this academic theory were enacted quickly as an operating concept by the U.S. Cyber Command and later embraced, to varying degrees, by successive and White House . <\/p>\n

Equilibrium in Cyber Rivalry<\/strong><\/p>\n

While these U.S. strategies might succeed in checking some adversary cyber operations, we find them unlikely to lead to any stable equilibrium, at least not one favorable to the United States. <\/p>\n

A stable<\/em> system is one in which a stimulus produces beneficial negative feedback, an automatic counteraction that reestablishes the equilibrium. Think of a thermostat or the Bismarckian balance of power system. In an unstable<\/em> system, a stimulus takes the system farther away from equilibrium, which can lead to an overreaction, causing further positive feedback such as a runaway conflict spiral. <\/p>\n

The best-known equilibrium for modern readers is mutually assured Destruction (MAD) during the Cold War, achieved through the deterrent capabilities of assured second-strike nuclear capabilities, as later codified by formal arms control agreements. A related equilibrium came about when President Kennedy signaled to Soviet Premier Nikita Khrushchev that he would accept the construction of the Berlin Wall.<\/p>\n

What determines whether systems are stable, and which type of system is persistent cyber engagement most like? <\/p>\n

In the supporting theories, such as Robert Gilpin\u2019s regarding imperial overstretch, an equilibrium represents the point at which neither strategic competitor can reap excess revenue over costs by pressing for further change in the status quo. In Gilpin\u2019s model, equilibrium occurs because power projection becomes more costly the farther from an empire\u2019s home base. In the alternative model of the security dilemma, equilibrium occurs when defensive operations and tactics are the best form of self-defense, and when a dollar spent on defensive capabilities can more than offset a dollar spent on attack capabilities. <\/p>\n

There is nothing like such a self-enforcing equilibrium in the cyber realm, nor do we expect one anytime soon. <\/p>\n

An equilibrium might occur in an environment where states use cyber capabilities as a pressure release to avoid broader conflict, blowing off inconsequential steam rather than resorting to more kinetic options. Many observers have argued that colonial competition and compensation served a similar safety valve in the three decades before World War I. But if so, the valve worked only until it didn\u2019t. Nations may push too far again under the illusion that their behavior is far from triggering any tipping points.<\/p>\n

In recent times, great power adversaries have been relatively restrained from direct cross-border armed attack in all<\/em> its forms, not just cyber. Any seeming cyber stability or predictability may just reflect this overall geopolitical situation. As Graham Allison claimed, \u201cthe past eight decades have been the longest period without a war between great powers since the Roman Empire.\u201d The ups and downs of cyber operations have always been . As crises multiply, cyber stability is likely to degrade as well. Cyber competition might soon be called upon to release more geopolitical pressure than it can handle.<\/p>\n

What has held for the first three decades of constant contact may not hold for the fourth, fifth, sixth, or beyond. <\/p>\n

Persistent Engagement and Instability<\/strong><\/p>\n

Another prominent proposal for cyber stability is persistent engagement. <\/p>\n

Advocates for deterrence through persistent engagement might argue that cyber conflict suffers from destabilizing positive feedback because the United States has not responded actively enough to its rivals\u2019 transgressions. Harknett and Fischerkeller embrace Thomas Schelling\u2019s concept of agreed competition and tacit bargaining, arguing that repeated \u201caction and interaction\u201d in cyberspace between adversaries leads to \u201cincreased clarity and reduced uncertainty regarding boundaries or limits on behaviors,\u201d engendering \u201cpredictability and potential stability.\u201d<\/p>\n

Disrupting adversaries might be a sound operating concept, but we question the theory\u2019s prediction that this is leading to stability under recent, present, and likely future circumstances. <\/p>\n

Such a disruptive approach to equilibrium would be easier if each side had narrow and compatible concerns, such as protecting critical infrastructure from attack. But nowadays, rival cyber powers are playing different games with different rules in pursuit of clashing interests. Russian President Vladimir Putin needs to conduct cyber disruption to destabilize the West to feel secure. To establish a regional autarky, Chinese Premier Xi Jinping believes he needs to steal technology and credibly threaten U.S. infrastructure. Meanwhile, the United States, wielding the most potent cyber panoply, is loath to give up any advantages with such dangerous rivals. All are used to easy gains from their cyber predation, with seemingly little risk. <\/p>\n

For reasons as much situational and political as cyber-technological, the main rivals all consider cyber offense a vital tool, producing the classic spiral escalation of the security dilemma rather than a stable defensive equilibrium. Strategic interactions are unlikely to be stable under these conditions. <\/p>\n

Persistent engagement, as conversation through counterattack, is likely to lead to destabilizing feedback loops in which emotion, cognitive biases, and organizational dynamics might encourage tit-for-tat responses. And there are few alternative communication channels to warn a rival that their tit-for-tat is swerving toward a disproportionate response. <\/p>\n

Long-term cyber stability, the original stated goal of U.S. Cyber Command, might emerge if rivals decided to play the same game or if geopolitical tension drastically relaxed, reducing the existential angst. If Russia became unafraid of regime change or the U.S. acceded to China becoming a regional autarkic hegemon, the rivals would rely less on the riskiest cyber operations, allowing room for possible equilibrium. MAD, which helped deliver nuclear stability, has not been a likely candidate to do the same for cyber, despite backers, as capabilities have never been sufficiently destructive. In the coming years, cyber MAD is slightly more plausible as artificial intelligence leads to worrying increases in vulnerability and improvements in offensive capabilities.<\/p>\n

Other well-established theories that aim to achieve strategic stability through strictly defensive measures seem less risky in principle, but can they be applied to the cyber realm? In the past, these took the form of arms control agreements to eliminate first-strike weapons, bans on exercising or training forces in a provocative manner, or using radars and satellites to monitor each other\u2019s nuclear delivery mechanisms. It seems hard to imagine how these models could be applied to cyber.<\/p>\n

In the absence of a structurally induced strategic equilibrium through dominance of the defense, the concept of persistent engagement relies more on a tactically induced equilibrium of action and interaction. In standard theories of mixed-motive competitive-cooperative games such as the prisoner\u2019s dilemma, the nearest analogue is the tactic of tit-for-tat. In a famous 1980 experiment, Robert Axelrod proved such equivalent retaliation as the winning strategy in an indefinitely repeated, symmetric game in which cooperation pays off more than mutual defection. Despite tit-for-tat leading to higher overall gains, each side often prefers, if possible, to defect while the other cooperates for larger relative gains.<\/p>\n

But tit-for-tat in the prisoner\u2019s dilemma is not a perfect fit with the theory of persistent engagement. Rather than coolly and rationally responding to defection with defection, the adversaries engaging in the gritty struggle of constant contact will perceive defections from cooperation regardless of intent. <\/p>\n

Read more The Supreme Court\u2019s Ballroom Non-Decision<\/a><\/p>\n

Not only will emotions run high, but each believes its own moves are acceptable while viewing the other\u2019s moves as treacherous defections. After all, the main rivals don\u2019t agree on what game is being played or the rules. <\/p>\n

For example, according to the U.S. intelligence community, Putin undermined the 2016 election in part because he assessed the \u201cPanama Papers disclosure and the Olympic doping scandal as US-directed efforts to defame Russia.\u201d His election interference in the U.S. presidential election led subsequently to U.S. outrage and intensification. <\/p>\n

Even within one country, different bureaucracies can play different games, frustrating any subtle tit-for-tat strategies. In response to an incident seen as particularly egregious, the U.S. military might reserve some highly punishing attacks, such as disrupting the home network of Chinese intelligence headquarters, in line with persistent engagement, but forgo such intrusions that are in line with accepted norms and therefore acceptable. But other responses, troubling to the Chinese Communist Party, would continue because they are not seen as part of the same game. The State, Treasury, and Justice departments might sanction or indict those behind the \u201cacceptable\u201d intrusion. Meanwhile, the intelligence community gathers geopolitical intelligence, and other parts of the military gain access to critical Chinese infrastructure to prepare for warfare. China may even assess embarrassing stories about Chinese leaders in U.S. media as defection. <\/p>\n

Two Models of Limited Competition<\/strong><\/p>\n

How this dynamic of limited cyber competition plays out is likely to depend on a crucial distinction\u2014whether the rivals are engaging in a balanced competition or a competition for dominance:<\/p>\n