{"id":75,"date":"2026-05-26T14:15:01","date_gmt":"2026-05-26T14:15:01","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/nationalconsumerreportss.com\/?p=75"},"modified":"2026-05-26T14:15:01","modified_gmt":"2026-05-26T14:15:01","slug":"will-the-war-change-irans-way-of-war","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/nationalconsumerreportss.com\/?p=75","title":{"rendered":"Will the War Change Iran\u2019s Way of War?"},"content":{"rendered":"
\n

On Feb. 28, U.S. and Israeli missiles\u00a0landed in Tehran, targeting Iranian military\u00a0installations, nuclear\u00a0facilities, and\u00a0leadership. In one day, Iran\u2019s second supreme leader of almost 40 years was dead, as were a number of his senior-most military and political advisers, and the country was at war.<\/p>\n

Read more How the World Sees Trump\u2019s America with Eve Fairbanks and Madeleine Schwartz<\/a><\/p>\n

Iran\u2019s military was designed to survive precisely the type of U.S. intervention it faces today and to impose costs on the regional states perceived to be supporting the regime\u2019s foreign adversaries. With this objective, Iran does not need to \u201cwin\u201d operationally to \u201cwin\u201d the war. It merely needs to \u201cresist\u201d and sustain itself through the conflict. Put differently, if the Islamic Republic survives, retains some military capacity that it can rebuild after the war, impedes certain U.S. objectives (such as regime change), and publicly messages success, it has won by its own preexisting definition.<\/p>\n

After initially providing confused rationales for the war, the Trump administration has now put forth a new main objective for its large-scale operations: the \u201cdestruction\u201d of core Iranian military capabilities. What success might look like in this context depends on how the administration defines \u201cdestruction,\u201d and if the 12-day war (dubbed Operation Midnight Hammer) is any indication, the administration\u2019s characterization of the war will likely be different from that of the expert community. The current dynamic of shifting U.S. objectives and Iran\u2019s resistance strategy sets up a likely scenario in which both the United States and Iran can walk away claiming to have \u201cwon.\u201d<\/p>\n

Putting aside the rationale\u2014and cost-benefit analysis\u2014for the war, this article focuses on what Iranian military capabilities might look like after the Trump administration determines the \u201cdegradation\u201d objective is accomplished and the war is over. Which of Iran\u2019s core capabilities are likely to survive the war? And where might Iran look to invest resources to reconstitute those capabilities?<\/p>\n

Iranian Doctrine After the War<\/strong><\/p>\n

Since 1979, Iran has designed its doctrine and developed military capabilities to pursue an asymmetric warfare strategy. The in Iran\u2019s strategic thinking and operational approach is that the country must be prepared to resist and fight conventionally superior adversaries, and to do so with limited financial means and under sanctions. This includes contending with global powers, such as the United States, that possess nuclear weapons.<\/p>\n

To this end, Iran\u2019s armed forces have tried to make up for their conventional shortcomings by investing heavily in capabilities they can develop at home and use in the \u201cgray zone\u201d: via the \u201cdeliberate use of coercive or subversive instruments of power [that] remain below the perceived threshold for direct armed conflict.\u201d As a result, Iran has not invested heavily in maintaining a conventional air force that could never match U.S. air capabilities. Instead, it has chosen to develop its missile and\u2014over the past decade\u2014drone capabilities, supplying them to proxies to expand its strategic depth and hold adversaries at risk. Likewise, instead of developing a conventional navy, the regime has invested in fast boats, sea mines, and other asymmetric capabilities that need not compete with the U.S. Navy.<\/p>\n

The war has helped Iran test its assumptions and capabilities, validating some of its choices and highlighting the flaws in others. While some aspects of this doctrine appear to have paid off during the war, others have proved less reliable for the regime. After the war ends, Iran may choose to continue its existing doctrine and reconstitute the without making any changes. As it has done in the past, Tehran will learn from the war and adjust its military doctrine and capabilities. Iranian armed forces have a\u00a0history of learning from their successes and failures, dating back to the Iran-Iraq War (1980-1988), when the regime spent a considerable time studying the tactics and techniques that worked and those that didn\u2019t. The regime\u2019s assessment shaped Iran\u2019s policies, strategy, and doctrine during the 1990s and until today.<\/p>\n

While it is too soon to know exactly how the war will affect Iran\u2019s thinking, it is already clear which capabilities have paid off for Tehran and which ones have not. The war has demonstrated that relying on state or non-state partners\u2014even those organized, trained, and equipped by the Iranian military\u2014will not create a bulwark against adversaries. Instead, Iran is likely to continue or increase its investment in organic capabilities such as its missile and\u00a0one-way attack drone programs. Crucially, many of the capabilities Iran may carry forward after the war will likely remain cost-efficient and designed to contend with the United States\u2019 much more sophisticated and costlier platforms and assets.<\/p>\n

A Divided Army<\/strong><\/p>\n

After the Islamic Revolution in 1979, Iran implemented a \u201ccoup-proofing\u201d mechanism by creating the Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) as a counterpart to its conventional armed forces, known as the Artesh, a legacy of the nation\u2019s monarchist past. The new revolutionary leadership initially viewed the Artesh with skepticism and still does to some extent: In a civil conflict or effort to overthrow the regime, the Artesh was perceived as likely to side with the people, not regime leadership. However, during the Iran-Iraq War, the Artesh proved its \u201cworth\u201d to the regime, justifying its continued existence. And following the eight-year war and the regime\u2019s modernization period, the IRGC and the Artesh began to develop separate lanes and a division of labor across the regime\u2019s national security apparatus. Today, Iran\u2019s core doctrinal capabilities reside with the IRGC, and the Artesh remains the junior partner in the relationship. The ongoing war has further diminished the Artesh\u2019s capabilities.<\/p>\n

Iran may also consider changes to its command-and-control structure, even as it has proved fairly resilient following a\u00a0systematic decapitation campaign by the United States and Israel. The ongoing campaign has impacted Iran\u2019s command and control significantly. Khamenei\u2019s son and successor, Mojtaba, is reportedly isolated. The death of Iran\u2019s secretary of the Supreme National Security Council, Ali Larijani, a key official \u201cwho could translate battlefield realities into political strategy,\u201d was\u00a0understood as potentially \u201cslow[ing] decision-making and coordination\u201d among leadership. And the general decimation of Iran\u2019s leadership has\u00a0made coordination and cohesive decision-making more difficult.<\/p>\n

Yet even Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamanei\u2019s death\u00a0did not create obvious paralysis in Iran\u2019s decision-making, with the regime surviving the aftermath of the strike and even intensifying its response against the U.S. and Israel in the days that followed. The resiliency echoes the IRGC-Quds Force\u2019s adaptability after the killing of Gen. Qassem Soleimani during President Trump\u2019s first term (albeit on a much larger scale). While the Quds Force\u2019s reach was diminished under Soleimani\u2019s successor, Esmail Qaani, it was able to adjust its tactics and procedures to sustain its presence in key countries throughout the Middle East. For example, Qaani delegated more command-and-control responsibilities to proxies in Iraq. This step afforded the Iraqi Shiite militias more flexibility but also fragmented the network and made them less responsive to Tehran. These examples demonstrate that Iran is better prepared to prevail in the face of key regime and military leadership changes.<\/p>\n

Iran\u2019s Military Reset<\/strong><\/p>\n

The highest impact change to Iran\u2019s thinking following the war could be a decision to pursue a nuclear weapon. Since Tehran formally halted its nuclear weapons program in 2003 and ended related activities in 2007, the U.S. intelligence community has that Iran had not yet made the decision to pursue the bomb. Shortly before the 12-day war over the summer, Director of National Intelligence Tulsi Gabbard\u00a0reiterated this assessment in testimonies before Congress. Director General Rafael Grossi of the International Atomic Energy Agency, which is a United Nations body tasked with verifying that states\u2019 nuclear programs remain peaceful, also\u00a0noted as recently as March that Iran did not have the \u201cstructured program to manufacture nuclear weapons\u201d (though he added the caveat that his agency does not have the access it should have to it). The United States must now prepare for that to change.<\/p>\n

Read more Rational Security: The \u201cNo Banner is Safe\u201d Edition<\/a><\/p>\n

Several factors are likely to shape the regime\u2019s nuclear aspirations and program. While the United States has significantly damaged Iran\u2019s nuclear infrastructure, the war may have\u00a0reinforced Iran\u2019s resolve to acquire a weapon. Previously, the costs of acquiring a weapon appeared to outweigh its benefits: The regime was concerned about inviting an attack on its territory if it chose to weaponize. Now that a conflict has occurred, that calculus no longer applies. Additionally, the countries threatened by Trump during his tenure (Venezuela, Cuba, and Iran itself) do not possess a nuclear deterrent. By contrast, North Korea, which does have nuclear weapons, has escaped the president\u2019s threats (and does not even appear in the 2025 National Security Strategy).<\/p>\n

U.S. and Israeli strikes have not completely destroyed Tehran\u2019s nuclear program, as the country maintains technical elements and a network of scientists, engineers, and technicians who will preserve the knowledge retained over the course of several decades of work on the nuclear program. Though subject to change, Iran still has \u201cenough\u201d highly enriched uranium to make 10 to 12 bombs and an even larger inventory of material that could produce \u201cbomb fuel\u201d in the future.<\/p>\n

Iran got the least bang for its buck with its proxies. Groups such as Lebanese Hezbollah, the Houthis in Yemen, and the Shiite militias in Iraq were historically a force multiplier for the regime\u2019s other core capabilities, affording it when engaged in conflict while avoiding all-out war, and doing so at a relatively low cost for Tehran. But when the conflict is overt, and the Iranian leadership feels the need to reassure its domestic populace while telegraphing to international audiences that it will defend itself and impose costs on its adversaries, proxies are less useful. Moreover, Israel has\u00a0successfully weakened Iran\u2019s chief proxy, Lebanese Hezbollah, which acted as the \u201chub\u201d to the \u201chub and spoke\u201d ecosystem of proxies. And it has struck Hezbollah in Lebanon, which raises the costs of Hezbollah\u2019s participation\u2014Hezbollah will be hurt not just abroad but also at home if it participates.<\/p>\n

While some Iranian proxies have responded to the war in some fashion, their responses were delayed. The Houthis only\u00a0\u201cjoined\u201d a month into the conflict, while Hezbollah responded on a\u00a0much smaller scale than anticipated. Proxies may have been both more willing and able to intervene on Iran\u2019s behalf if Israel had not engaged in its decapitation campaign since the Hamas attacks on Oct. 7, 2023. However, the combination of these campaigns and the ongoing war demonstrates that the proxies have agency and interests of their own, and will not (or\u00a0cannot) prioritize Iran\u2019s security and interests. To be clear, the treatment of Iranian non-state allies as proxies is largely a U.S. analytical framework. Tehran, for its part, refers to them as partners and may have had a different expectation about whether its proxies would intervene on its behalf than those of the authors and the broader U.S. analytical community. While we do not expect Iran to fully forgo its proxy network, it may decide to deprioritize it relative to its organic capabilities.<\/p>\n

Iran\u2019s most successful defense programs during this conflict are its missile and drone programs, perhaps at least in part because it is\u00a0difficult to target and disrupt their production. To be sure, publicly available estimates of Iran\u2019s missile and drone attacks paint a picture of a capability that often falls short, with\u00a0abysmal success rates: They can be imprecise and are often intercepted. And the United States has severely degraded Iran\u2019s missile and drone capabilities throughout the conflict\u2014a key U.S. stated objective\u2014even as these systems continue to be deployed everyday.<\/p>\n

But the Islamic Republic does not need to reach or maintain high success rates through its drones and missile programs to meet its objective of imposing a cost on the United States and the U.S.\u2019s regional partners. The drones can be\u00a0launched undetected, be operated\u00a0en masse to avoid radar, and impose high costs even in limited instances. Iranian drones have already targeted and damaged U.S. facilities and\u00a0assets in the region, costing U.S. taxpayers\u00a0billions of dollars. The program has allowed Iran to bring the conflict to Israel\u2019s territory and\u00a0disrupted one of the most lucrative sectors in the Persian Gulf\u2014tourism (to say nothing of the lives lost and\u00a0those injured). Meanwhile, relying on drones is cheap for Iran, but countering them is disproportionately expensive for the United States and its regional allies.<\/p>\n

Tehran has implemented a targeted approach to closing the Strait of Hormuz by threatening and imposing a toll on most vessels seeking to transit the passage. This has proved more successful than the most blunt scenario the analytical community had envisioned, and may serve as a future road map for the regime. The Trump administration has responded by imposing a blockade of its own to raise the costs of Iranian actions. To preserve this capability, Iran will likely rebuild some elements of its naval capabilities degraded by the U.S. military. Because Iranian naval doctrine is not based on blue-water capabilities and does not require large vessels such as aircraft carriers or destroyers (which it does not have the capacity to produce), its naval armaments are cheaper to reconstitute. The current conflict is unlikely to challenge Iran\u2019s prewar assumptions about the efficacy of its naval warfare approach, given its resource constraints.<\/p>\n

Other capabilities Iran will likely continue developing reside in cyber and information operations, as the war has likely proved these investments to be worthwhile. Short-term disruptions to its cyber capabilities imposed by the U.S. are likely just a blip: \u201cThe risk of damaging Iranian cyberattacks will rise.\u201d Tehran appears to have stepped up its information operations in the ongoing conflict\u2014having gone viral on U.S. social media platforms using memes and artificial intelligence-generated videos that tap into the American political and cultural Zeitgeist.<\/p>\n

Offensive capabilities aside, Iran will likely look to rebuild a network of defensive systems after the war. Iranian\u00a0air defense systems and\u00a0aircraft have been systematically targeted by U.S. and Israeli strikes. To quickly bolster its first-line defense, Iran\u00a0could turn to other countries to procure these systems. Moreover, whether or not the United States\u00a0launches a ground invasion this time around, Iran might be concerned that a future operation or war could involve U.S. troops fighting their way through Iranian territory. In the event of such a ground incursion, Iran has\u00a0ground troops and special operations forces that it could deploy. Future preparations to counter a land invasion might require Iran to invest more heavily in those forces.<\/p>\n

Conclusion<\/strong><\/p>\n

The Iranian political system and military will look different going forward. This war has allowed Iran to test its strategy and operational capabilities, giving the regime an opportunity to adjust them to strengthen its resistance capacity. The Islamic Republic is not new to navigating transitions, and sustaining itself through such transitions is a core component of its strategic approach to contending with its superior adversaries. Already, changes in the military command and political leadership, including the supreme leader, have taken place, and the regime has adapted its infrastructure, processes, and policies to minimize disruption to its core functions.<\/p>\n

The day after the war, a more determined Iran is likely to reassess its strategy and capabilities. The war may end, but the United States will be facing the third iteration of the Islamic Republic (following the 1979 revolution and the Iran-Iraq War), one governed by more radical leaders, likely determined to acquire a nuclear weapon, and more focused on organic capabilities than on outsourcing elements of its security to proxies.<\/p>\n

Read more The Legal Framework for Accession<\/a><\/p>\n<\/div>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"

The United States is degrading Iran\u2019s military capabilities. Will Iran rebuild them?<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":1,"featured_media":74,"comment_status":"open","ping_status":"closed","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"footnotes":""},"categories":[10],"tags":[],"class_list":["post-75","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","has-post-thumbnail","hentry","category-armed-conflict"],"yoast_head":"\nWill the War Change Iran\u2019s Way of War? - National Consumer Reports<\/title>\n<meta name=\"robots\" content=\"index, follow, max-snippet:-1, max-image-preview:large, max-video-preview:-1\" \/>\n<link rel=\"canonical\" href=\"https:\/\/nationalconsumerreportss.com\/?p=75\" \/>\n<meta property=\"og:locale\" content=\"en_US\" \/>\n<meta property=\"og:type\" content=\"article\" \/>\n<meta property=\"og:title\" content=\"Will the War Change Iran\u2019s Way of War? - National Consumer Reports\" \/>\n<meta property=\"og:description\" content=\"The United States is degrading Iran\u2019s military capabilities. Will Iran rebuild them?\" \/>\n<meta property=\"og:url\" content=\"https:\/\/nationalconsumerreportss.com\/?p=75\" \/>\n<meta property=\"og:site_name\" content=\"National Consumer Reports\" \/>\n<meta property=\"article:published_time\" content=\"2026-05-26T14:15:01+00:00\" \/>\n<meta name=\"author\" content=\"admin\" \/>\n<meta name=\"twitter:card\" content=\"summary_large_image\" \/>\n<meta name=\"twitter:label1\" content=\"Written by\" \/>\n\t<meta name=\"twitter:data1\" content=\"admin\" \/>\n\t<meta name=\"twitter:label2\" content=\"Est. reading time\" \/>\n\t<meta name=\"twitter:data2\" content=\"13 minutes\" \/>\n<script type=\"application\/ld+json\" class=\"yoast-schema-graph\">{\"@context\":\"https:\\\/\\\/schema.org\",\"@graph\":[{\"@type\":\"Article\",\"@id\":\"https:\\\/\\\/nationalconsumerreportss.com\\\/?p=75#article\",\"isPartOf\":{\"@id\":\"https:\\\/\\\/nationalconsumerreportss.com\\\/?p=75\"},\"author\":{\"name\":\"admin\",\"@id\":\"https:\\\/\\\/nationalconsumerreportss.com\\\/#\\\/schema\\\/person\\\/ef6e8820a5e2e961e9b8cda481436ac0\"},\"headline\":\"Will the War Change Iran\u2019s Way of War?\",\"datePublished\":\"2026-05-26T14:15:01+00:00\",\"mainEntityOfPage\":{\"@id\":\"https:\\\/\\\/nationalconsumerreportss.com\\\/?p=75\"},\"wordCount\":2655,\"commentCount\":0,\"image\":{\"@id\":\"https:\\\/\\\/nationalconsumerreportss.com\\\/?p=75#primaryimage\"},\"thumbnailUrl\":\"https:\\\/\\\/nationalconsumerreportss.com\\\/wp-content\\\/uploads\\\/2026\\\/05\\\/bcfb28d00bb73902216ab751d4521898.jpg\",\"articleSection\":[\"Armed Conflict\"],\"inLanguage\":\"en-US\",\"potentialAction\":[{\"@type\":\"CommentAction\",\"name\":\"Comment\",\"target\":[\"https:\\\/\\\/nationalconsumerreportss.com\\\/?p=75#respond\"]}]},{\"@type\":\"WebPage\",\"@id\":\"https:\\\/\\\/nationalconsumerreportss.com\\\/?p=75\",\"url\":\"https:\\\/\\\/nationalconsumerreportss.com\\\/?p=75\",\"name\":\"Will the War Change Iran\u2019s Way of War? - National Consumer Reports\",\"isPartOf\":{\"@id\":\"https:\\\/\\\/nationalconsumerreportss.com\\\/#website\"},\"primaryImageOfPage\":{\"@id\":\"https:\\\/\\\/nationalconsumerreportss.com\\\/?p=75#primaryimage\"},\"image\":{\"@id\":\"https:\\\/\\\/nationalconsumerreportss.com\\\/?p=75#primaryimage\"},\"thumbnailUrl\":\"https:\\\/\\\/nationalconsumerreportss.com\\\/wp-content\\\/uploads\\\/2026\\\/05\\\/bcfb28d00bb73902216ab751d4521898.jpg\",\"datePublished\":\"2026-05-26T14:15:01+00:00\",\"author\":{\"@id\":\"https:\\\/\\\/nationalconsumerreportss.com\\\/#\\\/schema\\\/person\\\/ef6e8820a5e2e961e9b8cda481436ac0\"},\"breadcrumb\":{\"@id\":\"https:\\\/\\\/nationalconsumerreportss.com\\\/?p=75#breadcrumb\"},\"inLanguage\":\"en-US\",\"potentialAction\":[{\"@type\":\"ReadAction\",\"target\":[\"https:\\\/\\\/nationalconsumerreportss.com\\\/?p=75\"]}]},{\"@type\":\"ImageObject\",\"inLanguage\":\"en-US\",\"@id\":\"https:\\\/\\\/nationalconsumerreportss.com\\\/?p=75#primaryimage\",\"url\":\"https:\\\/\\\/nationalconsumerreportss.com\\\/wp-content\\\/uploads\\\/2026\\\/05\\\/bcfb28d00bb73902216ab751d4521898.jpg\",\"contentUrl\":\"https:\\\/\\\/nationalconsumerreportss.com\\\/wp-content\\\/uploads\\\/2026\\\/05\\\/bcfb28d00bb73902216ab751d4521898.jpg\",\"width\":1024,\"height\":686},{\"@type\":\"BreadcrumbList\",\"@id\":\"https:\\\/\\\/nationalconsumerreportss.com\\\/?p=75#breadcrumb\",\"itemListElement\":[{\"@type\":\"ListItem\",\"position\":1,\"name\":\"Home\",\"item\":\"https:\\\/\\\/nationalconsumerreportss.com\\\/\"},{\"@type\":\"ListItem\",\"position\":2,\"name\":\"Will the War Change Iran\u2019s Way of War?\"}]},{\"@type\":\"WebSite\",\"@id\":\"https:\\\/\\\/nationalconsumerreportss.com\\\/#website\",\"url\":\"https:\\\/\\\/nationalconsumerreportss.com\\\/\",\"name\":\"National Consumer Reports\",\"description\":\"\",\"potentialAction\":[{\"@type\":\"SearchAction\",\"target\":{\"@type\":\"EntryPoint\",\"urlTemplate\":\"https:\\\/\\\/nationalconsumerreportss.com\\\/?s={search_term_string}\"},\"query-input\":{\"@type\":\"PropertyValueSpecification\",\"valueRequired\":true,\"valueName\":\"search_term_string\"}}],\"inLanguage\":\"en-US\"},{\"@type\":\"Person\",\"@id\":\"https:\\\/\\\/nationalconsumerreportss.com\\\/#\\\/schema\\\/person\\\/ef6e8820a5e2e961e9b8cda481436ac0\",\"name\":\"admin\",\"image\":{\"@type\":\"ImageObject\",\"inLanguage\":\"en-US\",\"@id\":\"https:\\\/\\\/secure.gravatar.com\\\/avatar\\\/50b1ad2e498f523425ee0a8cc5180a210646db1622662a3d56cc405d3e0c346a?s=96&d=mm&r=g\",\"url\":\"https:\\\/\\\/secure.gravatar.com\\\/avatar\\\/50b1ad2e498f523425ee0a8cc5180a210646db1622662a3d56cc405d3e0c346a?s=96&d=mm&r=g\",\"contentUrl\":\"https:\\\/\\\/secure.gravatar.com\\\/avatar\\\/50b1ad2e498f523425ee0a8cc5180a210646db1622662a3d56cc405d3e0c346a?s=96&d=mm&r=g\",\"caption\":\"admin\"},\"sameAs\":[\"http:\\\/\\\/nationalconsumerreportss.com\"],\"url\":\"https:\\\/\\\/nationalconsumerreportss.com\\\/?author=1\"}]}<\/script>\n<!-- \/ Yoast SEO plugin. -->","yoast_head_json":{"title":"Will the War Change Iran\u2019s Way of War? - National Consumer Reports","robots":{"index":"index","follow":"follow","max-snippet":"max-snippet:-1","max-image-preview":"max-image-preview:large","max-video-preview":"max-video-preview:-1"},"canonical":"https:\/\/nationalconsumerreportss.com\/?p=75","og_locale":"en_US","og_type":"article","og_title":"Will the War Change Iran\u2019s Way of War? - National Consumer Reports","og_description":"The United States is degrading Iran\u2019s military capabilities. Will Iran rebuild them?","og_url":"https:\/\/nationalconsumerreportss.com\/?p=75","og_site_name":"National Consumer Reports","article_published_time":"2026-05-26T14:15:01+00:00","author":"admin","twitter_card":"summary_large_image","twitter_misc":{"Written by":"admin","Est. reading time":"13 minutes"},"schema":{"@context":"https:\/\/schema.org","@graph":[{"@type":"Article","@id":"https:\/\/nationalconsumerreportss.com\/?p=75#article","isPartOf":{"@id":"https:\/\/nationalconsumerreportss.com\/?p=75"},"author":{"name":"admin","@id":"https:\/\/nationalconsumerreportss.com\/#\/schema\/person\/ef6e8820a5e2e961e9b8cda481436ac0"},"headline":"Will the War Change Iran\u2019s Way of War?","datePublished":"2026-05-26T14:15:01+00:00","mainEntityOfPage":{"@id":"https:\/\/nationalconsumerreportss.com\/?p=75"},"wordCount":2655,"commentCount":0,"image":{"@id":"https:\/\/nationalconsumerreportss.com\/?p=75#primaryimage"},"thumbnailUrl":"https:\/\/nationalconsumerreportss.com\/wp-content\/uploads\/2026\/05\/bcfb28d00bb73902216ab751d4521898.jpg","articleSection":["Armed Conflict"],"inLanguage":"en-US","potentialAction":[{"@type":"CommentAction","name":"Comment","target":["https:\/\/nationalconsumerreportss.com\/?p=75#respond"]}]},{"@type":"WebPage","@id":"https:\/\/nationalconsumerreportss.com\/?p=75","url":"https:\/\/nationalconsumerreportss.com\/?p=75","name":"Will the War Change Iran\u2019s Way of War? - National Consumer Reports","isPartOf":{"@id":"https:\/\/nationalconsumerreportss.com\/#website"},"primaryImageOfPage":{"@id":"https:\/\/nationalconsumerreportss.com\/?p=75#primaryimage"},"image":{"@id":"https:\/\/nationalconsumerreportss.com\/?p=75#primaryimage"},"thumbnailUrl":"https:\/\/nationalconsumerreportss.com\/wp-content\/uploads\/2026\/05\/bcfb28d00bb73902216ab751d4521898.jpg","datePublished":"2026-05-26T14:15:01+00:00","author":{"@id":"https:\/\/nationalconsumerreportss.com\/#\/schema\/person\/ef6e8820a5e2e961e9b8cda481436ac0"},"breadcrumb":{"@id":"https:\/\/nationalconsumerreportss.com\/?p=75#breadcrumb"},"inLanguage":"en-US","potentialAction":[{"@type":"ReadAction","target":["https:\/\/nationalconsumerreportss.com\/?p=75"]}]},{"@type":"ImageObject","inLanguage":"en-US","@id":"https:\/\/nationalconsumerreportss.com\/?p=75#primaryimage","url":"https:\/\/nationalconsumerreportss.com\/wp-content\/uploads\/2026\/05\/bcfb28d00bb73902216ab751d4521898.jpg","contentUrl":"https:\/\/nationalconsumerreportss.com\/wp-content\/uploads\/2026\/05\/bcfb28d00bb73902216ab751d4521898.jpg","width":1024,"height":686},{"@type":"BreadcrumbList","@id":"https:\/\/nationalconsumerreportss.com\/?p=75#breadcrumb","itemListElement":[{"@type":"ListItem","position":1,"name":"Home","item":"https:\/\/nationalconsumerreportss.com\/"},{"@type":"ListItem","position":2,"name":"Will the War Change Iran\u2019s Way of War?"}]},{"@type":"WebSite","@id":"https:\/\/nationalconsumerreportss.com\/#website","url":"https:\/\/nationalconsumerreportss.com\/","name":"National Consumer Reports","description":"","potentialAction":[{"@type":"SearchAction","target":{"@type":"EntryPoint","urlTemplate":"https:\/\/nationalconsumerreportss.com\/?s={search_term_string}"},"query-input":{"@type":"PropertyValueSpecification","valueRequired":true,"valueName":"search_term_string"}}],"inLanguage":"en-US"},{"@type":"Person","@id":"https:\/\/nationalconsumerreportss.com\/#\/schema\/person\/ef6e8820a5e2e961e9b8cda481436ac0","name":"admin","image":{"@type":"ImageObject","inLanguage":"en-US","@id":"https:\/\/secure.gravatar.com\/avatar\/50b1ad2e498f523425ee0a8cc5180a210646db1622662a3d56cc405d3e0c346a?s=96&d=mm&r=g","url":"https:\/\/secure.gravatar.com\/avatar\/50b1ad2e498f523425ee0a8cc5180a210646db1622662a3d56cc405d3e0c346a?s=96&d=mm&r=g","contentUrl":"https:\/\/secure.gravatar.com\/avatar\/50b1ad2e498f523425ee0a8cc5180a210646db1622662a3d56cc405d3e0c346a?s=96&d=mm&r=g","caption":"admin"},"sameAs":["http:\/\/nationalconsumerreportss.com"],"url":"https:\/\/nationalconsumerreportss.com\/?author=1"}]}},"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/nationalconsumerreportss.com\/index.php?rest_route=\/wp\/v2\/posts\/75","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/nationalconsumerreportss.com\/index.php?rest_route=\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/nationalconsumerreportss.com\/index.php?rest_route=\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/nationalconsumerreportss.com\/index.php?rest_route=\/wp\/v2\/users\/1"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/nationalconsumerreportss.com\/index.php?rest_route=%2Fwp%2Fv2%2Fcomments&post=75"}],"version-history":[{"count":0,"href":"https:\/\/nationalconsumerreportss.com\/index.php?rest_route=\/wp\/v2\/posts\/75\/revisions"}],"wp:featuredmedia":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/nationalconsumerreportss.com\/index.php?rest_route=\/wp\/v2\/media\/74"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/nationalconsumerreportss.com\/index.php?rest_route=%2Fwp%2Fv2%2Fmedia&parent=75"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/nationalconsumerreportss.com\/index.php?rest_route=%2Fwp%2Fv2%2Fcategories&post=75"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/nationalconsumerreportss.com\/index.php?rest_route=%2Fwp%2Fv2%2Ftags&post=75"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}